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Abstract.Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising tool for implementing
fine-grained access control.To solve the matters of security in single authority, access
policy public, not traceable of malicious user,we proposed a scheme of
multi-authority. Moreover, multi-authority may bring about the collusion of different
authorities.In order to solve these problem,we proposed a scheme of access tree
structure with policy hidden and access complex.Once the private key is leaked, our
scheme can extract the user ID and find it.If the authorities share their information
with each other,the scheme avoid them to combine together to compute the key
information and decrypt the ciphertext.Finally,the scheme proved to be secure under
selective-set of IND-CPA.
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1 Introduction
With the rapid development of cloud storage technology, more and more individuals
and enterprises tend to store the private data in the cloud server. To ensure the
security of the information is facing more severe challenges. Sahai and Waters[1] first
proposed the notion of attribute-based encryption(ABE) in 2005,in which a user is
described with a set of attributes and the secret key is generated by the authority on
the basis of these attributes. The user decrypts the ciphertext base on the threshold
access structure in the above system. In order to achieve more complex access
structures, Goyal et al.[2] proposed the scheme of key policy attribute-based
encryption (KP-ABE) in which the access policy is embeded in the key.Except for
KP-ABE, Bethen court et al.[3]proposed the notion of ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE).Different from KP-ABE, the access policy is
embeded in the ciphertext related to attributes.In both of the above ABE notions, a
user can decrypt the information only if the access policy satisfies the attributes in
key or ciphertext.
1.1 Multi-authority attribute-based encryption
In traditional single attribute authority ABE,since the user or authority is not fully
trusted in the system，once the authority is malicious and brought through by an
attacker，it will bring a huge threaten to all the users in the system.Moreover.single
attribute authority to assign the attributes may hit a bottleneck on efficiency more
easily since the algorithm and data grows. To solve the problem,in 2007 Chase et al.[4]
proposed an Optimization Schemes of ABE with multiple authorities. Different
attribute authority charges different attributes respectively and issues attribute keys to
users,furthermore reduces the risk of trust assumption in single authority.Despite all
this,there is still a central attribute authority which is fully trusted and manages the
information specifically defines the identities of users and the state of each attribute
authority.
As a result of multiple authorities, Another derive challenge is how to prevent
collusion attacks by users or the multiple authorities.Different users with different
access structure may combine together to generate a new decryption key towards
another access structure.Different attribute authorities may also share its own
information with each other to gain the knowledge of the decryption key.
1.2 Attribute-based encryption with accountability
In traditional ABE，since the user or authority is not fully trusted in the system，once
the private key or other secret information leaked, it is unknown who should be
responsible for it .To address this problem, Li et al.[5] first presented a traceable
multi-authority CP-ABE, but it is confined to expressing a strict “AND” gates with
wildcard policy. However, Liu et al.[6] pointed out that the malicious user cannot be
traced simply by the approach in [7]. Later, Zhou et al.[8] proposed a traceable
multi-authority CP-ABE scheme in which the policies can be expressed in any
monotone access structures.
2 Definitions
2.1 Bilinear maps
we define multiplicative cyclic groups   ,    with prime order and set bilinear map
e:  ×  →  .g is the generator of   . If e has the following properties:
1.Bilinear: In e:  ×  →  , e (aP,bQ) =   ( ⡨ᮀ)
   for all P,Q∈   and all
a,b∈Zp .
2.Non-degenerate: The map does not send all pairs in   ×   to the identity in
  .Observe that since   ,    are groups of prime order this implies that if P is a
generator of   ⡨then e (P,P) is a generator of   .
3.Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e (P,Q) for for all
P,Q∈  .
2.2 Access tree structure
In CP-ABE with access tree structure, a set of attributes is embedded in the ciphertext
as a structure of a tree.Each leaf node of the tree stores the attribute and the value
assigns to it. Moreover,parent node encrypts its secret value and transmits to leaf
node,only the users with these attributes have the ability to decrypt it.Each non-leaf
node maintains a threshold gate n/m,m is described by the number of its children and
n is the threshold value, representing the minimum number of attributes required to
decrypt it. As shown in Figure 1, the threshold of Node 2 is 3/3 means that only the
user who has the attributes “male”、“computer” and “Grade 2” can decrypt this
node.The threshold of Node 4 is 1/2 means that the user who has the attributes
“network” or “cloud” can solve the problem.
Figure 1 Tree structure
Each node has a polynomial px to describe it. Assume that the degree of px is
 x⡨which is one less than the threshold value n,that is  x=n-1.The secret value of
this node is px(0) and for its children from left to right,the secret value is px(1)、px(2)...
etc.So for for any other node(except for root node), px(0)=pparent(x)(index(x)).
2.3 Syntax and security model
A multi-authority ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption with
accountability scheme should consist of following five algorithms.
1.INIT:Select a security parameter κ and run the algorithm to output a master
public key(mpk) and a master secret key(msk).
2.Key Gen:An interactive between authority and user.Seting P(id,τ) is the public
input where id is the user’s global identify in the system and τ is the access tree
associate to the user.The private input is the msk.At the end of the interactive,a private
key did,τ of P(id,τ) is extracted.
3.Encryption:Taking the mpk, an attributes set ω and a message M as
parameters and works out the ciphertext C.
4.Decryption:Taking did,τ of P(id,τ),ciphertext C as parameters and output the
plaintexts M if ω∈τ.
5.Trace:Taking a well-formed private key did,τ and outputs the associated id.
The above proposed scheme should be indistinguishable under chosen plaintext
Attack(IND-CPA).In this situation, excepting for encryption algorithm is leaked,the
selected plaintexts and associated ciphertexts are also known by an attacker.In this
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scheme we extend the Selective-set (SS) model to our setting.The basic mentality to
security proof of IND-CPA is as follows.
1.INIT:The adversary declares an attributes set ω*,which is to be challenged.
2.Setup:The challenger runs the algorithm and outputs public parameters to the
adversary.
3.Phase 1:The adversary runs the algorithm with the inputs of pairs of (idj,τj),in
which ω* is not the subset of τj for all j.
4. Challenge:The adversary submits two messages M0,M1with equal length.The
challenger flips a coin as v,v=0 or v=1 , encrypts Mvwith ω* ,output the ciphertext
and passes to the adversary.
5.Phase 2:Repeat Phase 1.
6.Guess:The adversary outputs a guess   of v.
The advantage of adversary in this game is defined as Pr[  = v]-1/2.
3.Our scheme
In this multi-authority system, set A1、A2...Ak as the K attribute authorities，which are
in charge of the disjoint N attributes associate to users. Set CA as the single center
authority, which is fully trusted and manages the information specifically defines the
identities of users and the state of each attribute authority. CA maintains a secret
function V(x) mapping id to Zp
∗ a table T,storing the user ID and V(id).
1.INIT:We set {  ⡨ຂ} as the i-th attribute in Ak which is mapped to   
∗ where
k=1…K and i=1…N. Choosing se1,se2......sek as the PRF seeds of each authority. Each
authority k chooses a different   ⡨ຂ for each user. Moreover, randomly choose
x,y,y0,y1,s0,w,w1,w2,θ∈  
∗ and Z,h,X,Y,Y1,g1,g2,g3,g4∈G1,set X=  , Y=  , Y1=  
  ,
g1=   , E1= ( ⡨ )  ,   = 
  ,   = 
  ,   =    = 
 ,Y0= ( ⡨ )  .
Now set the master secret key as msk=(x,y,y0,y1,s0,w,w1,w2,θ),and the master public
key as mpk=(E1,Z,h,X,Y,Y1,Y0,g1,g2,g3,g4).
2.Key Gen:To Authority k, set sek and   ⡨ຂ as the secret key and   ⡨ຂ= 
  ⡨ຂ as
public key where i=1…N. For user u, set   ⡨ຂ=    ຂ and randomly choose
polynomial p of d-1 degree where d is the threshold of attributes to decrypt authority k.
Set p(0)=  ⡨ຂ and secret key   ⡨ຂ={  
 (ຂ)   ⡨ຂ},i   ຂ.
To user P with access tree structure τk, Set   =       and provides it to CA with
an interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the (  ⡨ ).CA
randomly chooses   =V(id), 
      
∗ and returns to P with  ຂ ⡨  
  =(  
  ⡨  
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  )
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To CA, set sek,  ⡨ຂ of all attribute authorities as private values and set
   =  
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  .P then chooses         
∗ and compute
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and i   ຂ.
3.Encryption: For attribute set   ,Randomly choose s    
∗ and set
  =  ,    ⡨ຂ =   ⡨ຂ
  ຂ   
 
  ,E=  ( ⡨  )
   .So the ciphertext is as
C=(  ⡨  ,  ⡨  ⡨  ⡨  )=(   , 
 ,  ⡨   ⡨ ⡨  ⡨ຂ).
4. Decryption: For each leaf node ,we compute algorithm
 (  ⡨ຂ⡨  ⡨ຂ)=e( ⡨  )
  ຂ   if number of   
     ຂ
  is more than threshold value. we can
use Lagrange interpolation formula to obtain e( ⡨  )
      for parent node x of each
leaf node.Finally we can decrypt the tree with e( ⡨  )
     = e( ⡨  )
  ⡨ຂ =  ⡨ຂ
  . Since
 (  ⡨  ) ( (  ⡨ )    e(  
ຂ      ⡨  ))=e( 
 ⡨  )=e( 
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and e(  ⡨   )   = 
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   =e(  ⡨  
(     ຂ= 
    ⡨ຂ  ))   = 
    ⡨ຂ
   =e(  ,  
  ) = e(     ⡨  ) ,
So we have
e(  ⡨   )  (  = 
    ⡨ຂ
   )  e(  ⡨  )/( (  ⡨ )
    e(  
ຂ      ⡨  ))= C4/M
5.Trace: If  ຂ ⡨  is leaked and well-formed, the key component of    has the
information of   =V(id). Searching table T in CA and output the corresponding id.
4. Secure proofs
This section will give the security proof for above ABE scheme of IND-SS-CPA
under the DBDH assumption. First we give the definition of DBDH assumption.
For the given bilinear map e:G1×G1→G2 and groups G1,G2 with prime order ,
letting g be a generator of G1,DBDH assumption holds if two distributions
(  ,   ,   ,  ( ⡨ )   ) and (  ,   ,   ,  ( ⡨ ) ) are indistinguishable in any
polynomial-time adversary  , where a,b,c,z are randomly chosen in   
∗ . we flip a fair
binary coin   outside    view, if  = 0,the challenger sets the distribution as
(  ,   ,   ,  ( ⡨ )   ), otherwise as (  ,   ,   ,  ( ⡨ ) ).
In other words, we say that if   has advantage   against our scheme, then we can
build a simulator that can solve DBDH problem with advantage    .
1.Init:The simulator receives the target attributes set  ∗ from adversary  .
2.Set up: Set e(A,B)=e(  ⡨  ) (this implicitly set w   =   ).X=C= 
 ,Z=  .
3.Phase 1:Suppose β requests a private key (id ,τ) where τ( ∗)=0,which means
ω∗τ.The simulator will receive R=         with an interactive witness
indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the (  ⡨ ) from  .It then selects   ⡨  ⡨    
  
∗ .The simulator extract the private key as follows. We set the query private key as
  ຂ   ຂ ⡨ =(  ຂ    ⡨  ຂ    ⡨  ຂ    ⡨  ຂ    ⡨  ຂ    ) in which
  ຂ    
  =( ຂ  )     (    
  )   ຂ ,  ຂ    
  =      (    
  )  ຂ ,
  ຂ    
  =  ,
For the attribute authorities with  ຂ
      
   d, we set p(0)=Fsk(u)=  ⡨ຂ ,
 ( )=   ⡨ຂ where zk⡨u and polynomial ρ are randomly chosen.
  ຂ    
  =  
  (ຂ)   ⡨ຂ(i   ຂ
      
 ) , otherwise   
 (ຂ)   ⡨ຂ(i   ຂ
      
 ).
  ຂ    
  = (    ⡨ຂ      (ຂ)   ) where k are honest authorities and k are corrupted
authorities.
Let   =  +  ஠  (    
  )/(x  ຂ ) where r    
∗ we have
  ຂ    
  =( ຂ  )      ஠  (    
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It is clear that   ຂ   ຂ ⡨  has the same distribution with  ຂ ⡨  and the simulator
has the ability to construct the private key.
4.Challenge:   will submit two plaintext   、   with same length which are
about to challenge to simulator. The simulator randomly chooses s∈  
∗ ,   =  
 
,
 =   ,flips a fair binary coin and returns the ciphertext of   (  =   ஠    =  ) as
 ∗=( ∗⡨   
∗ ⡨   
∗ ⡨   
∗ ⡨   
∗ ⡨   
∗ ⡨)=( ∗⡨    ⡨  ⡨    ⡨   ⡨ 
   ⡨ຂ)
=( ∗⡨  
  ,    ,   
   ,   
 ⡨     ⡨ຂ).
If   =  ⡨T=   ⡨     . Letting  =cs,
 ∗=( ∗⡨  
  ,    ,   
   ,   ( ⡨ )
    ⡨     ⡨ຂ).
=( ∗⡨   ,   ,     ,   ( ⡨ )
   ⡨    ⡨ຂ) .
so C∗ is the valid ciphertext.Otherwise if   =  ⡨  
∗ gives no information about
  .
5.Phase 2:The simulator acts exactly as it did in Phase 1.
6.Guess: will submit a guess   of v. If   =v, the simulator will output   = 0 to
indicate that it was given  ( ⡨ )    to form valid tuple, otherwise it will output   =
1 to indicate it was given a random 4-tuple.
The advantage of the adversary in solving DBDH problem is    . The security
proves.
5. Analysis
5.1 collusion resisting
This section will give the illustration about collusion resisting. Since E=  ( ⡨  )
   ,
In order to collusion, they must construct  ( ⡨  )
  .
In our system, different user should have different   ⡨ຂ in the same attribute
authority. Assume that there exists a situation that each user’s attributes just come
from one authority. In our scheme, there is no equality between    and   ⡨ຂ.
Moreover, different user has different   ⡨ຂ, even each user shares with each other,
there is no way to combine them together to compute. Moreover, even attribute
authority shares secret values {  ⡨ຂ} and {  ⡨ຂ}where i   ຂwith each other. Since we
have e(  ⡨  
(     ຂ= 
    ⡨ຂ  ))   = 
    ⡨ຂ
   =e(  ,  
  ) and
 (  ⡨ຂ⡨  ⡨ຂ)= e( ⡨  )
     = e( ⡨  )
  ⡨ຂ =  ⡨ຂ
  . They just have the probability to
construct  ( ⡨  )
  .
5.2 Efficiency analysis
Table 1 gives the contrastive analysis about the efficiency of our multi-authority
CP-ABE scheme with other schemes [9,10].In the table,k1 stands for the number of
attributes in   ⡨k2 stands for the number of attributes in  ຂ.|G1| stands for the size of
the element in G1, |G2| stands for the size of the element in G2.K is the number of
attribute authority in the system. In the cost of encryption and decryption , Exp stands
for cost of exponentiation and Pairing stands for cost of bilinear pairing .
Table 1 COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES
Scheme schemes [9] schemes [10] Our scheme
Private key size (2k2)|G2| (k2+1)|G1| |  
∗ |+ (k2+3) |G1|
Ciphertext size (2k1)|G1|+(1+k1)|G2| 3|G1|+|G2| k1|  
∗ |+(3+k1)|G1|+|G2|
Enc time (5k1+2)Exp+k1Pairing 4Exp (3+ k1)Exp+Pairing
Dec time 2k1Pairing+k1Exp 4Pairing 4Pairing+(K+2)Exp
Access structure LSSS “And” gate Access tree
Authority Multi-authority Multi-authority Multi-authority
Policy hidden yes no yes
Collusion resisting no no yes
traceable no no yes
6. Conclusion
Our scheme realized Multi-authority ABE encryption.Although the secret values of
each authority is leaked in the system ,Collusion is still forbidden. Subsequently, we
design a access control scheme with policy hidden,using access tree structure.Once
the private key or other secret information leaked, it is traceable who should be
responsible for it .Finally, we prove the schemes security with BDBH assumption and
analyze its performance with other similar scheme.
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